Employment Law Alert UK – September 2026

AI

SRA issues warning notice on misuse of AI.

On 17 August 2026 the SRA issued a warning notice on the misuse of AI, which reminds solicitors and law firms that existing regulatory duties fully apply to the use of AI in legal work. The warning notice highlights two main areas of concern: “AI hallucinations” and threats to client confidentiality. The SRA stresses that lawyers – and those supervising them – remain personally accountable for their work and outputs, and that firms must have effective governance structures, systems and controls in place. On confidentiality, the notice warns that putting client information into open/public AI tools effectively places it in the public domain, likely breaching confidentiality and permanently waiving legal professional privilege. The SRA therefore states that client data should only be used in AI systems (whether free or paid) where robust contractual, technical and organisational safeguards are in place, with particular care required in in- house settings. “Appropriate human oversight, informed professional judgement and a proportionate, risk-based approach are essential to ensure compliance with your regulatory and legal obligations.”

Whistleblowing

Passages of police report did not constitute qualifying protected disclosures.

The EAT has upheld the ET’s decision that a long-serving police officer had not made any “protected disclosures” for the purposes of section 43A ERA 1996 and had not been constructively dismissed. The Claimant asserted that three “Protected Disclosure Reports” he gave to the IPCC in 2014 contained 19 protected disclosures. He alleged that he was subjected to 22 detriments by the Respondent from March 2014 onwards, culminating in his retirement in January 2017 which he characterised as constructive dismissal. The ET found that none of the alleged disclosures satisfied the statutory tests in sections 43B and 43F ERA (including reasonable belief, public interest and disclosure to a prescribed person), and consequently dismissed all detriment and automatic unfair dismissal claims; it also held that, in any event, the Claimant’s resignation was not in response to a repudiatory breach, that no relevant “last straw” was made out and that he had affirmed the contract. On appeal, the EAT concluded that the Tribunal had applied the correct legal tests to the pleaded disclosures and was entitled to find that neither protected disclosures nor constructive dismissal were established. (Jackson v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police)

Employee relations

Supreme Court clarifies that to evidence less favourable treatment only requires part-time status to be an effective cause, not the sole cause.

The Supreme Court has considered the scope of protection from less favourable treatment afforded to part-time workers by regulation 5 of the Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 and held that the right not to be treated less favourably does not depend on proving that part-time status was the sole reason for the treatment, it is sufficient to show that part-time status is an effective cause. The Claimant was a part-time taxi driver who, alongside other taxi drivers, was required to pay a flat circuit fee, regardless of the number of hours worked during a week. The Claimant brought a claim arguing that this amounted to less favourable treatment on account of his part-time worker status. The question for the Supreme Court was the proper construction of regulation 5(2), which limits the protection to cases where the less favourable treatment is “on the ground that the worker is a part-time worker” and not objectively justified. The Supreme Court, with Lady Simler giving the leading judgment held that “on the ground that” in regulation 5(2)(a) is satisfied where part-time status is a real and effective cause of the treatment (even if there are other operative reasons). It does not have to be the sole ground for the treatment. This aligns the causation test with the broader effective cause test, following wider discrimination law principles. (Augustine v Data Cars Ltd)

DEI

EAT upholds key liability decisions in philosophical belief case.

The EAT has upheld the decision of the ET that the Claimant's anti-Zionist beliefs were protected beliefs for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 and that he had been unfairly dismissed and discriminated against because of those beliefs. The Claimant was employed by the University of Bristol as a Professor of Political Sociology. After complaints were made about statements made by the Professor, a disciplinary process was initiated, and the Claimant was ultimately dismissed for gross misconduct. The EAT agreed that the Claimant's beliefs satisfied the Grainger criteria, that he had been dismissed because of the manifestation of those beliefs, and that his dismissal was disproportionate. The EAT did, however, conclude that the ET had failed to sufficiently explain the basis for its conclusion that there was a 30% chance that the Claimant’s employment would have ended lawfully by October 2023 (in light of social media comments made by the Claimant in August 2023). This issue was remitted for reconsideration at the remedy hearing. (University of Bristol v Dr David Miller)

EAT considers consent in context of test for sexual harassment.

The EAT has dismissed an appeal challenging the ET’s rejection of claims of sexual harassment, victimisation and constructive unfair dismissal, and upheld the ET’s approach to both consent and capacity when intoxicated. The Claimant alleged eight incidents of sexual harassment by a colleague between December 2021 and November 2022, victimisation, and constructive dismissal. The ET dismissed the Claimant’s claims, finding that the alleged incidents did not take place as the Claimant alleged. The EAT held that, although “consent” is not a statutory element of harassment under section 26 Equality Act 2010, it is relevant to whether conduct is “unwanted”, and endorsed the ET’s focus on that statutory concept: on the ET’s unchallenged findings, the claimant had capacity to consent despite intoxication and did in fact consent, and a “drunk consent” remains valid unless drink removes capacity. More generally the EAT noted that the giving of consent will make it less likely that conduct is “unwanted”, but consent is not determinative, and crucially, where there is an imbalance of power, sexual conduct may be unwanted, despite consent. The EAT also cautioned against substituting “unwanted” with other terms such as “unwelcome” or “uninvited”, which may cause confusion, instead advocating focus on the statutory test under the Equality Act 2010. (Miss AB v GH Ltd)

Tribunal procedure

ET could not make consent order where one party withdraws consent before order is made.

The EAT has held that an ET could not use its “consent order” power under rule 64 of the 2013 Rules (now rule 62 of the 2024 Rules) to dispose of a claim where, by the time the order was to be issued, one party had withdrawn their consent to the proposed terms. The Claimant was dismissed in 2018. He brought a successful victimisation claim. In 2021 a remedy judgment was issued but subsequently appealed. In January 2024 the parties reached agreement on a revised settlement sum. This was initially accepted by the Claimant, but before any order was made, he changed his mind and informed the ET that he no longer consented and wanted the remitted issues heard. The ET sought to make a “by consent” order implementing the settlement terms. The EAT found that tribunals are permitted to make a consent order on terms agreed in writing at any time or orally at a hearing, (even if any “full and final settlement” clause in the underlying agreement would itself be unenforceable under section 144 Equality Act 2010); but crucially, the rule only applies where, at the time the tribunal makes the order, both parties consent to it. On that basis, HHJ Auerbach held that the ET had no power in October 2024 to dispose of the remitted remedy issues via a consent order. The case was remitted back to the ET for determination of the outstanding remedy issues. (Edward v North London NHS Foundation Trust)