E-signatures & WhatsApp Messages: The Common Law Strikes Back

We consider Reid-Roberts and Another (as joint trustees in bankruptcy of Audun Mar Gudmundsson) v Hsiao Mei-Lin and Another [2026] EWHC 49 (Ch) (15 January 2026).

Introduction

The signing of documents using electronic signatures has become widespread since the COVID-19 pandemic.  Today's technology has, however, not yet ousted certain common law principles laid down in the age of paper.

Facts

Audun Mar Gudmundsson and Hsiao Mei-Lin were married in 2009 and, together, they bought a house and had a son and a daughter.

The marriage would not, however, endure and Ms Lin commenced divorce proceedings in 2017.  The couple discussed the financial implications of their divorce in email exchanges and WhatsApp chats in December 2018.

Their correspondence assumed particular importance because Mr Gudmundsson was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt and all his property became vested in trustees in bankruptcy.

Ms Lin claimed that the email exchanges and WhatsApp chats (the latter in particular) had successfully transferred Mr Gudmundsson's interest in the former matrimonial home to her before his bankruptcy.

The trustees in bankruptcy disagreed.  They contended that Mr Gudmundsson's beneficial interest in the property had not been transferred to Ms Lin and remained available to meet the claims of his creditors.

To make good her case, Ms Lin had to clear the hurdle presented by s. 53(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925.

Law

Section 53(1)(a) states that no interest in land can be either created or disposed of "except by writing signed by the person creating or conveying the same".   Section 53(1)(c) sets out similar requirements for the disposition of an equitable interest.

It is worth noting in passing that a disposition under section 53(1) does not need to be contained in a single document.  This obliged the court to consider the totality of the exchanges and chats between Mr Gudmundsson and Ms Lin in December 2018.

By contrast, a contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land must be in writing and incorporate all the terms which the parties have expressly agreed in one document (under section 2 of the Law of Property Act (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989).

First Instance

At first instance, Deputy ICC Judge Frith:

• decided that the WhatsApp chats satisfied the requirements of s. 53(1) but declined to give effect to the disposition because of case law which (he believed) required that such a disposition in the context of divorce proceedings had to be approved by the court and that such approval had not here been given; and

• exercised the statutory discretion conferred on him by s. 335A of the Insolvency Act 1986 and declined to grant the trustees an order for the immediate sale of the couple's former home.  Instead, he ordered the sale to be deferred until no later than 2032 to enable the couple's children to continue to attend their local school.

Appeals

The deputy judge's findings failed to satisfy either Mr Gudmundsson's trustees in bankruptcy or Ms Lin and, as a result:

• the trustees appealed against the deputy judge's order postponing sale and argued that any postponement should be for a much shorter period (perhaps no more than three months); and

• Ms Lin cross-appealed against the deputy judge's finding that the WhatsApp messages did not amount to a disposition of Mr Gudmundsson's beneficial interest in their former home on the basis that such a disposition required court approval.  Ms Lin argued that the judge had been mistaken as to the law.

Both appeals were considered by the High Court; although it is the second of these with which we are concerned in this article.

High Court

Mr Justice Cawson decided that it was not necessary for any disposition made by Mr Gudmundsson to be approved by the court as a precondition of its validity.

This made it necessary for him to decide whether the decision of the deputy judge that the couple's correspondence in December 2018 had amounted to a disposition under section 53(1).

Cawson J concluded that the correspondence fell (in his words) "well short of supporting a finding" that Mr Gudmundsson had, in the 2018 communications with Ms Lin, "evinced an intention to divest himself immediately of his beneficial interest" in his former home.

However, in case an appeal court should disagree with him, Cawson J then considered whether it was theoretically possible for a WhatsApp message to satisfy the requirements of section 53(1).

He believed that, in an appropriate case, it could do so but there was a further requirement which also needed to be satisfied but which had not been complied with in this case.

This was the requirement that the signature of the party making the disposition had to be affixed with the intention of authenticating the document (or, in this case, the text of the relevant WhatsApp message).

Cawson J traced this requirement back to the leading 19th century case of Caton v Caton (1867) LR 2 HL 127 which concerned a short, handwritten memorandum which described the terms upon which property would be settled on trust on the marriage of a couple.

The memorandum was written out by the future husband and referred to him several times in the body of the text.  He did not, however, sign the memorandum at the foot of the document.

The House of Lords decided that the memorandum was not a disposition for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds 1677 because it had not been "signed".

This was because the alleged grantor had not demonstrated an intention to authenticate the terms of the memorandum.  His name, although he had written it in his own hand in several different places in the text, simply referred to him as a party to the proposed trust.  It could not be said to be his signature.

Judgment

Cawson J observed that when a WhatsApp message is opened on a recipient's mobile phone, the name of the sender appears automatically at the top of the chat (or may simply show the sender's mobile telephone number).

In the circumstances, he found it difficult to conclude that Mr Gudmundsson had demonstrated the necessary authenticating intent given that his name was incidental to the WhatsApp chats, as opposed to being an integral part of them.

He therefore concluded that the WhatsApp chats in this case would not have satisfied the requirements of section 53(1) even if he had found that they could be read as giving effect to a release or disposition of Mr Gudmundssson's interest in the former matrimonial home.

As a result, Cawson J found in favour of the trustees in bankruptcy on the question of whether the WhatsApp messages were a disposition under section 53(1).

Notable Notes

The judgment in Reid-Roberts is notable because:

• it demonstrates that it is theoretically possible (in appropriate cases) for a WhatsApp message to qualify as a disposition of an interest in land for the purposes of section 53(1); and

• it reminds us that the insertion of an e-signature into a document or electronic message requires authenticating intent on the part of the signatory and therefore represents an additional formality which needs to be satisfied to ensure enforceability.

Comment

The judgment reflects legitimate judicial concern about the inadvertent entry into important legal transactions by relatively casual means, without full and careful consideration.

The case is also a reminder that, despite the widespread use of e-signatures, the enabling technology remains grounded on established case law which, despite originating in a different age, continues to be relevant.

Perhaps the best-known example of this is the requirement that a person who acts as the attesting witness to the execution of a deed needs to be in the physical presence of the signatory and that virtual presence is insufficient.

The judgment is a useful counterpoint to the judgment in Jaevee Homes Limited v Steve Fincham (trading as Fincham Demolition) [2025] EWHC 942 (16 April 2025) in which the High Court decided that an exchange of WhatsApp messages had satisfied the (different) requirements for the formation of a contract (see the link to our article on that judgment).